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Building Strategic Thinking Skills for the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Civilian Staff

Submitted for the Employment of Civilian Personnel Prize Essay Contest

9 MAY 2000

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20000920 158

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED					
2. Security Classification Authority:					
3. Declassification/Downgrading Sche	3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:				
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.					
5. Name of Performing Organization: Dean of Academics Office					
6. Office Symbol:	7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207				
8. Title (Include Security Classification): (U) Building Strategic Thinking Skills for the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Civilian Staff					
9. Personal Authors: Beverly Buffki					
10.Type of Report: FINAL	11. Date of Report: 9 MAY 00				
12.Page Count: 18					
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Dean of Academics, Naval War College, for the Employment of Civilian Personnel Prize Essay Contest. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: strategic - thinking - executive - benchmarking - OPNAV - civilian - training - leadership - capabilities - decision					
15.Abstract: OPNAV currently lacks a comprehensive, tailored executive development program for its civilian workforce. Several existing Navy leadership development programs were reviewed, and it was determined that they do not meet all of OPNAV's requirements for civilian employee growth. This paper provides alternative training solutions for OPNAV civilian executive development.					
16.Distribution / Unclassified Availability of Abstract:	Same As Rpt DTIC Users				
17.Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED					
18.Name of Responsible Individual: Dean of Academics, Naval War College					
19.Telephone: 841-2245	20.Office Symbol: 1				

Chief Naval Operations (OPNAV) Background

OPNAV currently lacks a comprehensive, tailored executive development program for its civilian workforce. Several existing Navy leadership development programs were reviewed, and it was determined that they do not meet all of OPNAV's requirements for civilian employee growth.

OPNAV is the military organization within the Department of the Navy, headed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson. Figures 1 and 2 show how OPNAV fits into the organizational structure. OPNAV staff determines strategy and policy for the Navy; therefore strategic thinking is an inherent competency and critical for long term policymaking. For this reason, we chose to focus on the Senior Executive Service (SES) core competency of Strategic Thinking in order to identify a skill set that could be used to meet training requirements.




Figure 1, Dept. of the Navy Org Chart




Figure 2, OPNAV Org Chart

OPNAV has approximately 800 military employees (primarily officers) and 300 civilian employees. Roughly 45% of the civilians are GS-13 through SES, most are Program Analysts, and they work in and around the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Civilian employees are hired from other Navy organizations; few, if any, have been developed within OPNAV.

Research shows that 60% of the OPNAV civilian workforce meet the criteria for retirement. Most of these employees are at the GS-15 level. The experience and training needs for future civilian leaders are not adequate to succeed these potential retirees. Succession planning is being studied by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Civilian Personnel/EEO) staff, therefore, the statistics in Figure 3 to support the position on training, not to address retention issues.

Figure 3 shows the breakout of employees by retirement eligibility and grade, as extracted from the OPNAV Alpha Report in May 1999. The Alpha Report provides demographic data on current OPNAV employees (e.g., series, code, and years of service).




Figure 3, Retirement Eligibility of OPNAV Civilians

Major Issues Within OPNAV

Two years ago the OPNAV Civilian Leadership Council (CLC) commissioned a report by Martin Research, Inc. This study interviewed approximately forty civilian employees and ten Navy Captains over a three-day period. The results were delivered to the CLC and endorsed by the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations. Here are the top five findings:

- 1. **Job Satisfaction**. OPNAV civilian employees feel like "second-class citizens...[it] is a civilian workforce that is depressed, unmotivated, and reaching only a fraction of its potential productivity."
- 2. The military/civilian relationship is stressed at best. OPNAV military officers feel ambivalent towards civilians, as they'd rather work with other military. "Needless to point out, this does not present the optimal situation for workplace effectiveness and efficiency. Worse, it closes the lines of communications, dramatically increases office tension, and foments an "us vs. them" mentality."

- 3. Constant Rotation of Supervisors is a source of stress among civilians. Additionally "the new supervisors have limited experience in dealing with civilians and <u>no</u> understanding of civilian personnel policies and procedures."
- 4. "The lack of training opportunities was very much a sore point with civilian employees...they are offered no training that would facilitate an employee's upward mobility." However, in the last year, OPNAV has changed policy to include forty hours of civilian training per person, per year. It is hoped that the training selected by the employee is relevant to position and upward mobility... and not just to get out of the office.
- 5. Preparation for higher paying jobs. The report pointed out that OPNAV has little concern for civilian's career paths, and that "there are many roadblocks in place that serve to stagnate employees and keep civilians where they are." A recommendation from this study encourages OPNAV to take a more proactive role in the advancement of its civilian employees.

There are several more findings, but these five are the most relevant to this study. It is recommended that the Martin Research Report be read (or re-read) by those interested, as little has changed since the report was issued. It should also be noted that in September 1998, 442 civilians were on board; there are approximately 300 civilians employed within OPNAV now.

Several GS-13 employees have left the organization in the last year. Although OPNAV can be a stressful organization to work for, it is usually the pinnacle of one's Navy career. When a civilian joins the OPNAV team, they have usually participated in one or more training programs; they're sharp, articulate and most have experience in the field. Unfortunately, after a few years many OPNAV employees become discontented primarily based on the five reasons previously mentioned.

Strategic Thinking Defined

Before tackling the issue of how to train personnel to be strategic thinkers, the question that needs to be addressed is "What is Strategic Thinking?". The guidance for SES Executive Core Qualifications lists the following competency/tasks for Strategic Thinking:

- Formulates effective strategies consistent with the business and a competitive strategy of the organization in a global economy.
- Applies a long-term perspective in analyzing policy issues and developing strategic plans.
- Develops objectives and sets priorities consistent with the organization's long term strategies.
- Adjusts strategic policies and plans in response to change, both internal and external.

Several Senior Executives were canvassed for their definitions and have listed some of their responses below:

Mark Honecker, Dept. of the Navy OPNAV, defined Strategic Thinking as the melding of critical thinking and knowledge-management skills. It's an evolving process of formulating a plan or vision for the future. It's gathering facts from various sources, examining those facts and making sense of them - from more than one perspective.

Bill Ryzewic, Dept. of the Navy CINCPACFLT, stated that strategic thinking to him meant out-of the box, innovative thinking among a diverse group. He stressed the importance of having diversity when thinking strategically.

William C. Gibson, Jr., Dept. of Energy Strategic Petroleum Reserve, defines strategic thinking as being linked to long range planning combined with a vision of organizational change or improvement. It can be organization-wide or more focused on a segment or function. Strategic thinking involves a process, which includes the aforementioned as well as the actions to reach the objective. Strategic thinking does not have to be done alone.

Wayland Coker, President, Coker Logistics Solutions, defines strategic thinking as the EXPLORATION of the role and potential effects of human decisions...other tools/styles of thinking are better suited to the investigation of other more technical aspects of reality. This implies that good strategic thinking must be structured to help human players make decisions and allow them to learn about the effects of those decisions. I think of strategic as "high level" thinking...much better forum for "what if" kinds of discussions, and for testing out new thoughts/ideas...and a requirement before you go to the more detailed kind of thinking planning, project management, taskings, execution, etc.

Strategic thinking theory provides a flexible skill used to create and sustain competitive advantage in the face of rapid change by improving the decision making process. It provides a context in which informed action can occur. Strategic thinking theory did not appear out of thin air. It can be linked to, and evolved from, other recent major business practice concepts such as Senge's (1990) concept of the learning organization. Senge's premise is straightforward: given

the pace and unpredictability of change in today's business environment, the ability to learn and to leverage that learning within an organization is the critical skill for ensuring success.

Total Quality Management (TQM) has also been widely embraced. Interestingly, much of the underlying practice of TQM, as described by Deming (1982) in his "Fourteen Principles for Transformation," echoes themes similar to Senge's. Another immensely popular initiative, sharing TQM's focus on both customers and processes, is the concept of reengineering, or process redesign, described by Hammer and Champy (1993). They make an argument that initiatives like teamwork and empowerment fail because they are not linked to the drivers of a business - the business processes themselves.

In the strategy field, influential authors like Hamel and Prahalad (1994) and Mintzberg (1994) are advocating a shift in emphasis from strategic planning to strategic thinking. Mintzberg defines strategic thinking as the capability of an individual or group to capture disparate pieces of information and synthesize that learning into a vision of the long-term direction that a business should pursue. This litany of indictments against the types of planning processes in place at most large firms is long, and mirrors the faults that Senge and Deming found with traditional management approaches. These faults include, but are certainly not limited to: breeding bureaucracy, choking initiative, favoring incremental over substantive change, emphasizing analysis and extrapolation over creativity and invention, and denying those closest to the customer a voice in the process.

Strategic thinking augments these other business practices by emphasizing thought processes such as synthesis and intuition, which are difficult to objectively measure but critical to organizational success. Strategic thinking values constant reevaluation and making the best possible decision given the information available, rather than limiting possible actions due to preconceived restrictions. A good strategic thinker is not content to excel under current circumstances, but is constantly attempting to attain a position of future competitive advantage.

Strategic Planning vs Strategic Thinking

The Chief of Naval Operations establishes a vision and sets policy for the operational Navy. For many years there was a known threat to the security of the nation and the strategic planners had contingency plans for many scenarios. Today the potential threats are less defined; therefore, there is a greater need for the policy makers to think strategically. This section is designed to explain the differences between strategic planning and thinking. The primary differences between strategic planning and strategic thinking have been summarized in Table 1:

	Traditional Strategic Planning	Strategic Thinking	
Nature	Activity	Capability	
Trigger	Assigned Time	Event	
Objective	Budgeting/Resource allocation	Positioning	
Time Frame	Short-term and Long-term	Long-term	
Mental Task	Analysis	Synthesis	
Frequency	Routine/Annual	Continuous	
Output	Forecast/Prediction	Innovation/Reaction/Preemption	

Table 1, Strategic Planning vs. Strategic Thinking

Complexity, inter-relatedness, and intuition replace predictability, causality, and logic as organizations move from strategic planning to strategic thinking. Strategic thinking enables individuals to continually synthesize information - it allows for flexibility in the individual "How" in order to achieve an organizational "What." The Corporate Executive Board quotes Arnoldo Hax, MIT Sloan School of Management, "Show me a company with a strong strategic planning department and I will show you a company that does not think strategically."

The Corporate Executive Board report (1999) identifies middle managers as the catalysts for the move from organizational strategic planning to individual strategic thinking:

"'Middle' managers appear to have the greatest opportunity to develop and use strategic thinking competencies because they have the opportunity to blend strategic intent with operational data to influence strategic direction. Middle managers "gatekeeper" role between front-line production and management maximizes their changing roles from strategy implementers to initiators. In response to this change of expectations for middle managers, strategic skills of front-line employees needs to improve, encouraging strategic thinking deeper in the ranks of the organization."

Despite this evaluation, the Corporate Strategy Board (1999) stated that:

"Despite the popular impression that corporate strategy will be vastly improved merely by asking broad swaths of the workforce to 'think strategically,' efforts to include lower-level employees and managers in strategy creation and development are reaping very few returns".

The Corporate Strategy Board determined three strategies that could be employed to successfully embed strategic thinking within an organization; establishing the foundation, building the experience base, and fostering strategy capabilities. The Corporate Strategy Board also identified four challenges to successful implementation of strategic thinking: inadequate skills and tools transfer, lack of available time, senior management rejection, and ineffective evaluation and reward. Every strategic thinking program reviewed exhibited aspects of both. We intend to employ the Corporate Strategy Board process as a framework to review the data compiled on organizational efforts to develop strategic thinking.

Establishing the Foundation

Our research has determined that strategic thinking is a leadership competency that is highly desired in executives in most private and public organizations. Long-term organizational success depends not so much on achieving the goals of strategic plans, but on establishing a process to not only meet current organizational requirements but also anticipate future opportunities and continuously leverage expertise from every employee.

Most of the organizations we contacted value strategic thinking as a leadership competency, but none of them had developed a comprehensive program to promote, develop, and leverage this

skill throughout their organization (other than at the executive level). This may be due to these organizations' definition of what a strategic decision is, rather than a reflection of desired employee skills. Strategic thinking is a relatively new paradigm and it may be that many organizations are following the traditional top-down implementation strategy. Strategic thinking needs to be applied wherever long-term, innovative decisions are made, but it also enhances everyday decision making as well.

The Corporate Executive Board published a report, <u>Embedding Strategic Thinking</u>: <u>Addressing the Need to Develop Line Strategists</u> (1999), which proposes a systemic process to improve strategic thinking skills within organizations and concludes that developing the strategic thinking skills of "middle managers" will produce the greatest leverage to instilling strategic thinking within an organization. The majority of employees within OPNAV can be categorized as "middle managers" due to their responsibility to combine strategic awareness with operating experience. Because they communicate both up and down the organization, they can influence decision making strategy from the bottom up, as well as from the top down.

The primary leadership development program utilized by OPNAV is the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP). It is administered and centrally funded by Department of Defense (DoD). It is a new program that has only been in existence for three years. The DLAMP is a six-year program and entails a one-year rotation, one year of professional military education, and eight two-week courses off site. This program is open only to a limited number of DoD executives and strategic thinking as a topic is subsumed within an extensive leadership development curriculum.

Alternatives to DLAMP include the Executive Potential Program and individual training initiated by the employee, such as graduate school and professional military education after hours, which is usually not reimbursed. OPNAV does offer every civilian forty hours of paid training per year. Other Navy training programs exist, but are considered feeder programs to future OPNAV employees.

Building the Experience Base

Before an employee at any level of an organization can think strategically, he or she must learn the appropriate skills and obtain the proper tools. This establishes an individual foundation upon which an organizational process can be built. The fact that developing strategic thinking skills in leadership positions is a topic considered critical to private and public organizations such as General Motors, Ameritech, the U.S. Customs Service, Raytheon Naval and Maritime Systems, the U.S. Naval War College, and the U.S. National Defense University. This demonstrates that organizations can overcome the ineffective nature of traditional training through customizing strategy curricula and delivery while including outside perspectives.

The desire to develop strategic thinking at General Motors (GM) at all levels of the company is evidenced in the designation of "Strategic Thinking and Execution" as a "Global Competency" which applies to all employees. Within this "global" perspective, strategic thinking at GM is defined as:

Develops strategies which will drive the enterprise toward the ideal state by continually learning, adapting, and creating, and by balancing ambiguity with factual understanding and intuition with analysis. Creates an environment conducive to developing and realizing strategies by managing the iterative nature of the process, assessing and taking calculated risks, innovating, and motivating other to embrace the vision.

This definition certainly could apply to any employee given a foundation in strategic thinking theory and practice. The only class on strategic thinking provided by General Motors Leadership College is limited to senior executives. GM appears to have come to the conclusion that these skills will be leveraged most successfully at a higher organizational level than with the front-line managers.

Reflecting the rapid changes in the automobile industry, GM has aggressively redefined many existing business processes. It has also developed new ones, one of, which is a decision-making process called the Dialogue Decision Process (DDP). Over the course of eight years and hundreds of applications, GM has refined this process for increasing participant knowledge. GM now has a Strategy Support Center that oversees the delivery of this program.

This is a process utilizing a facilitator, a sanctioning group and a set of tools to enable the participants to analyze and work a significant problem. The sanctioning group is made up of senior company officials who outline the business issue to be addressed and provide critical feedback during the analysis phase of the exercise. The participants or work team, become "owners" of the problem. Issues are identified that cut across corporate silos and require participants to take a macro approach, such as updating the corporate stance on global warming.

The GM Dialogue Decision Process consists of four basic steps:

- Framing the problem this is accomplished by the facilitator with materials provided
- Presentations of Alternative Policies brainstorming process which includes all reasonable alternatives
- Analysis this includes the introduction of uncertainty using computer simulation software (understand value and risks of various approaches)
- Consensus this includes the adoption of a final approach to the issue

Strategic thinking skills show up under Ameritech's "Business Process Management" metacompetency under "Problem Analysis and Decision Making" with skill elements strikingly similar to those in GM's definition of strategic thinking. However, the Ameritech Institute also falls into the same pattern of providing strategic thinking training only to first-line managers and higher executives.

Of the Federal organizations, the U.S. Customs Service identifies strategic thinking as a skill critical to senior managers, important to mid-level managers and not as important to supervisors; again staff-level personnel are excluded. The Naval War College and National Defense University have developed strategic leadership processes, which synthesize strategic thinking, strategic planning, and unique DoD leadership requirements. The Naval War College model:




Diagram 1, Naval War College Model

The Naval War College graphically illustrates the strategic leadership process as four interlocking sub-processes. The strategic concepts within these sub-processes are: environment, expertise, tension, energy, and ethos. These concepts, once internalized, provide an intuitive grounding in characteristic which the Naval War College has determined to be specifically appropriate to strategic decision making and leadership within the Navy. The National Defense University proposes a similar process for strategic leadership, but further refines levels of leadership within organizations and attendant responsibilities for each level, as shown in Table 2.

	Strategic Leadership	Organizational Leadership	Direct Leadership
Vision	Create the vision	Create the plans	Execute the plans
Teamwork	Integrate structure/ purpose	Design interdependencies	Forge teamwork
Values	Articulate cultural imperatives and values	Set command climate	Model and reinforce values
Information	Establish concept base for information systems	Engineer information systems	Generate/apply information

Table 2, Leadership Roles

This model provides well-defined roles for every level of an organization and relates the roles to each other and the strategic functional areas.

Raytheon Naval and Maritime Systems does not provide formal training for strategic thinking to their leaders based on the relatively small size of their organization and business base. Instead they take their most experienced leadership core to semi-annual offsite meetings and under the

direction of a professional facilitator, look at their market 10 years into the future. If market conditions are relatively stable they make few, if any, changes to their strategic thinking. They review every possible combination of their products in the global market place and have a detailed strategy for each one. They also look at new markets and new products.

These six organizations have taken slightly different approaches to laying the foundation for strategic thinking. Three out of the six basically adhered to the Executive Strategy Board's recommendation to implement strategic thinking at the first-line supervisor level, however two DoD sources and Raytheon framed strategic thinking more as an individual leadership skill, which may be a feature inherent to DoD culture. Strategic thinking materials developed within DoD by the National Defense University and the Naval War College encourage creativity within loose theoretical frameworks and provide applicability that external programs would lack. They carry the hallmark of strategic thinking - adaptability - into their design and implementation.

Fostering Strategy Capabilities

The next crucial aspect of establishing an environment that fosters strategic thinking is building an experience base. This requires an organization to provide occasions for strategic thought by providing personnel with the necessary time and resources and facilitating access to the required inputs. The fact that the six aforementioned organizations have identified strategic thinking as a core competency of executive and/or individual leadership, and developed strategic thinking courses to define the applicability of this skill within their respective decision making processes, indicates that they encourage strategic thinking.

A primary obstacle to strategic thinking is a lack of time to consider strategic issues in daily circumstances and the associated difficulty of obtaining the appropriate information. Time must be carved out of the increasingly hurried schedules of all staff expected to be involved in the process. These personnel must also be provided access to the greatest scope of information possible in order to come to a decision; the decision will only be as good as the information that goes into it. Raytheon Naval and Maritime Systems representative take six Senior Executives off-site and utilize the services of a professional facilitator to assist the executives with a ten year look into their companies future. As an introductory step to making strategic decisions at the staff level, suggest OPNAV set up a "shadow" committee to perform simulated strategy reviews of current, real strategic issues. This could be mirrored after the GM Dialogue Decision Process. By examining critical organizational issues and providing "recommendations" on these issues, the participants would be introduced to the OPNAV strategic thinking process, compare their process and recommendation to the "real" results, and come to a better understanding of the challenges to the organizational decision making process. Rotational assignments to the Fleet and Field Activities are good for broadening OPNAV employees experience and stay current with operationally changing environments. The result will be an employee with an improved ability to think strategically.

The final aspect of the Executive Strategy Board's process is fostering strategic thinking capabilities. It is recommended that OPNAV develop a measurement system that recognizes

strategic thinking and rewards improvement and achievement against a well-defined set of standards. All six organizations discussed in this paper have identified strategic thinking as a skill necessary for leadership. General Motors, Ameritech, the Customs Service, and the Office of Personnel Management (in its model for high performance leaders) further target it as an executive competency; while the Naval War College, Raytheon Naval and Maritime Systems, and the National Defense University define it as an individual leadership skill. In either context, the underlying message is that exceptional performers in these organizations need this skill. Strategic thinking is a skill that has a short shelf life; it must be exercised regularly in order to retain its effectiveness in a continuously changing world. Measurement systems, therefore, must also reflect this inherent mutability to strategic thinking and allow employees to clearly benchmark their performance as well as understand associated risks and rewards.

Efforts to encourage strategic thinking cannot succeed if organizations are not willing to commit appropriate resources to provide continuous support and encouragement to personnel engaged in strategic activities. Just as strategic thinking theory emphasizes connectivity and sensitivity to changing conditions, so individuals or groups who engage in strategic thinking and decision making must remain acutely aware of the context in which they are acting. Whatever the context, in order for effective strategic thinking to get a healthy start in OPNAV, staff must be given opportunities beyond training to experience it.

Developing an objective way to measure and reward strategic thinking is difficult, given its abstract nature, but there is little else that can be done to encourage staff to actively demonstrate that skill. If a common set of behaviors can be defined that encompass the organization's strategic thinking goals, they could be rolled into existing performance measures. Because strategic thinking is critical to OPNAV's mission, it must be defined and codified in the standards of its employees. In order to ensure that the greatest breadth of information is synthesized in any strategic action, a network of strategic thinkers is needed within the organization to reinforce and double-check decisions through a number of viewpoints. Strategic decisions by definition are long-term and profound and effect the entire organization; conversely, if input is missing from the decision making process, then the consequences of that omission can be just as long-term and profound.

CONCLUSION

Recommend OPNAV establish a program similar to General Motors Dialogue Decision Process, for both military and civilian personnel. This training opportunity will provide mid-grade (GS-13/14 and LCDR/CDR) staff the time and resources to build strategic thinking capabilities. This will accomplish two things; first it will establish a working relationship between civilians and the military in a structured environment which could lead to an appreciation for the work each segment does, and second it will allow OPNAV an opportunity to assess the ability of it's employees to act as Strategic Thinkers. Based on that assessment, a training/development program can be established to address areas of improvement. Future exercises can be utilized to assess the success or failure of the training programs.

Encourage OPNAV leadership support of civilians who choose to attend U.S. Naval War College courses. Support is defined as providing time during the workday for reading and report writing, as well as access to computers and the Internet to facilitate completion of assignments. Those civilians who complete the coursework should be recognized for their efforts, including travel and per diem expenses to attend graduation week exercises at the Naval War College. Finally, this additional effort should be recorded and recognized during the individual's annual performance review and Individual Development Plan. A similar process has been implemented at the McDonald's Corporation and we encourage OPNAV to model their efforts.

Strategic thinking is a skill that must be used regularly in order to retain its effectiveness in a continuously changing world. Employees must be given opportunities beyond training to experience and implement strategic thinking skills. Rotational assignments to the Fleet and Field Activities are good for broadening OPNAV employees' experience and keeping them current with operationally changing environments.

Finally, we highly recommend OPNAV support and encourage participation in the Executive Potential Program. The program includes: 360-degree feedback, a one-year Leadership Development Plan (a road map for personal development), Meyers-Briggs Personality Inventory, two 60-day rotational assignments, SES interviews and shadow assignments, and one month of executive-based training. These elements are directly applicable to OPNAV's civilian's needs for leadership and career development.

It is our hope that this report be distributed and utilized to its fullest extent, and that OPNAV contact the benchmarking partners listed in the appendix.

Benchmarking Points of Contact

Jack Land General Motors University Detroit, Michigan (313) 667-5239

Jay J. Jamrog Executive Director of Research Human Resource Institute - Eckerd College (727) 864-8330

Shelly Lloyd Human Resources McDonald's Corporation (630) 623-3060

Dr. Charles Chadbourn Naval War College Washington, D.C. (202) 433-6218

Jay DeRosier Raytheon Naval and Maritime Systems (425) 356-3812

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE COURSES

The U.S. Naval War College offers the following courses as part of their continuing education curriculum. These courses are offered in the Washington, D.C. area several evenings a week at the Pentagon, Crystal City, and Washington Navy Yard. Each course runs from September through April; summer courses are offered as well.

Strategy and Policy: This course is founded on the Clausewitzian premise that "war is a continuation of policy with the addition of other means." Strategy is the bridge that connects the state's goal with the operations of its military forces. Students are familiarized with the fundamentals of foreign policy and military strategy. In addition, the course assists students in developing a coherent framework for analysis of decisions involving the use of force to achieve national objectives. The course is presented through a series of historical case studies examining specific examples of strategic-political interaction. The case study topics have been carefully chosen to focus on historical situations which illustrate the enduring and recurring concerns of the strategist.

National Security Decision Making (NSDM): The NSDM course educates students in the effective selection and leadership of armed forces within national resource constraints. The course provides instruction in: the strategic planning and selection of future military forces; systematic approaches to programmatic resource choices under conditions of high uncertainty; and the nature of economic, political, organizational and behavioral factors affecting selection and command of military forces.

Joint Maritime Operations (JMO): JMO is an executive development course that emphasizes planning and decision making factors at the joint task force level for operations in the maritime environment. Operational problems require military officers to make increasing use of many disciplines. The JMO course employs a multi-disciplinary approach, providing the student the opportunity to synthesize various ideas that include maritime strategy, joint and service doctrine, military decision making, operational planning, naval warfare, military warfare, threat assessment, and war-gaming techniques. JMO applies these ideas to military problems requiring decision in dynamic situations.

Applications for enrollment may be obtained from and returned to:

PRESIDENT CODE 1G NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING RD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

Or call: (401) 841-6519

Visit their web site at: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cce/

E-mail: cce@nwc.navy.mil

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General Motors University - Virtual Campus Intranet Page (No access is allowed to those outside the company, but hard copies were provided)

Special Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank the following people for their assistance in preparing this paper: Sheldra Baker-Robinson, Todd Brighton, Charles Bush, Judy Dunsworth, Dave Hardison, Steve Lemelin and Terrell Williams.